I’m a fellow of the Center for Advanced Studies in the Humanities (KFG) Human Abilities in Berlin. Starting December, I’ll be a postdoctoral fellow at the Department of Philosophy of Universität Zürich, and part of the SNSF research consortium (NCCR) Evolving Language.
My primary areas of research are the philosophy of language and natural language semantics. Most of my current work revolves around the nature of meaning and semantic properties, topics that I approach in connection with related issues in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. Parallel to this, I have interests, and have published work, in the history of philosophy, Eastern philosophy, and classical studies.
I did a PhD in philosophy and cognitive science under Andrea Moro at Università San Raffaele & IUSS Center for Neurocognition, Epistemology and Theoretical Syntax, and a PhD in philosophy and social science under François Recanati at the Institut Jean Nicod & École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales. Before that, I got a BA in ancient philosophy and an MA in the history of philosophy, both from Università San Raffaele. Along the way, I’ve been a visiting student at MIT’s Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, a visiting fellow at Harvard University’s Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, and a Fernand Braudel-IFER fellow at the Fondation Maison des Sciences de l’Homme.
Below some of the things I’ve written, with links to external archives for preprints.
Lexical innovation and the periphery of language
Linguistics and Philosophy
abstract | preprint & doi coming soon
Lexical innovations (e.g., zero-derivations coined on the fly by a speaker) seem to bear semantic content. Yet, such expressions cannot bear content as a function of the semantic conventions in force in the language, since they are not part of its lexicon. This is in tension with the commonplace view that the semantic content of lexical expressions is constituted by semantic conventions. The conventionalist has two immediate ways out of the problem. The first is to preserve the conventionalist assumption and deny that lexical innovations bear semantic content. The second is to dynamicize the conventionalist assumption, that is, argue that presentations of unattested expressions trigger an augmentation of the standing semantic resources of the language and instantiate semantic content as a result of this underlying update. The paper argues that the issue is best addressed by suspending the conventionalist assumption, and describes the immediate metasemantic implications of the claim.
What are words and how should we individuate them? There are two main answers on the philosophical market. For some, words are bundles of structural-functional features defining a unique performance profile. For others, words are noneternal continuants individuated by their causal-historical ancestry. These conceptions offer competing views of the nature of words, and it seems natural to assume that at most one of them can capture the essence of wordhood. This paper makes a case for pluralism about wordhood: the view that there is a plurality of acceptable conceptions of the nature of words, none of which is uniquely entitled to inform us as to what wordhood consists in.
According to the perceptual view of language comprehension, listeners typically recover high-level linguistic properties such as utterance meaning without inferential work. The perceptual view is subject to the Objection from Context: since utterance meaning is massively context-sensitive, and context-sensitivity requires cognitive inference, the perceptual view is false. In recent work, Berit Brogaard provides a challenging reply to this objection. She argues that in language comprehension context-sensitivity is typically exercised not through inferences, but rather through top-down perceptual modulations or perceptual learning. This paper provides a complete formulation of the Objection from Context and evaluates Brogaard’s reply to it. Drawing on conceptual considerations and empirical examples, we argue that the exercise of context-sensitivity in language comprehension does, in fact, typically involve inference.
Natural language appears to allow the ascription of properties of numeral symbols to the denotation of number referring phrases. The paper describes the phenomenon and presents two alternative explanations for why it obtains. One combining an intuitive semantics for number referring phrases and a predicate-shifting mechanism, the other assigning number referring phrases a structured denotation consisting of two parts: a mathematical object (the number) and a contextually determined numeral symbol. Some preliminary observations in favor of the second analysis are offered.
Consider the following sentence: “Mary meditated on the sentence ‘Bill is a good friend’ and concluded that he was a good friend”. It is standardly assumed that in sentences of this sort, containing so‐called “closed” quotations, the expressions occurring between quotation marks are mentioned and do not take their ordinary referents. The quoted NP “Bill” refers, if anything, to the name ‘Bill’, not to the individual Bill. At the same time, the pronoun “he”, apparently anaphoric on quoted “Bill”, refers to the individual Bill. The case seems to invalidate the intuitive principle that pronouns anaphoric on referential expressions inherit their reference from their antecedents. The paper formulates the argument, argues that sentences exhibiting the described pattern do not constitute evidence against the intuitive principle, and proposes an alternative account of the anaphoric relation involved.
According to mainstream linguistic phonetics, speech can be modeled as a string of discrete sound segments or “phones” drawn from a universal phonetic inventory. Recent work has argued that a mature phonetics should refrain from theorizing about speech and speech processing using sound segments, and that the phone concept should be eliminated from linguistic theory. The paper lays out the tenets of the phone methodology and evaluates its prospects in light of the eliminativist arguments. I claim that the eliminativist arguments fail to show that the phone concept should be eliminated from linguistic theory.
The combination of panpsychism and priority monism leads to priority cosmopsychism, the view that the consciousness of individual sentient creatures is derivative of an underlying cosmic consciousness. It has been suggested that contemporary priority cosmopsychism parallels central ideas in the Advaita Vedānta tradition. The paper offers a critical evaluation of this claim. It argues that the Advaitic account of consciousness cannot be characterized as an instance of priority cosmopsychism, points out the differences between the two views, and suggests an alternative positioning of the Advaitic canon within the contemporary debate on monism and panpsychism.
According to Originalism, word types are non-eternal continuants which are individuated by their causal-historical lineage and have a unique possible time of origination. This view collides with the intuition that individual words can be added to the lexicon of a language at different times, and generates other problematic consequences. The paper shows that such undesired results can be accommodated without abandoning Originalism.
The entry provides an overview of the way the issues surrounding the nature of lexical meaning have been explored in analytic philosophy, and a summary of relevant research on the subject in neighboring scientific domains. Though the main focus of the entry is on philosophical problems, contributions from linguistics, psychology, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence are also considered.
This paper presents the hypothesis that the representational repertoire underpinning our ability to process the lexical items of a natural language can be modeled as a system of mental files. To start, I clarify the basic phenomena that an account of lexical knowledge should be able to elucidate. Then, I propose to evaluate whether the mental files theory can be brought to bear on an account of the representational format of lexical knowledge by modeling mental words as recognitional files.
Emma Borg defines semantic minimalism as the thesis that the literal content of well-formed declarative sentences is truth-evaluable, fully determined by their lexico-syntactic features, and recoverable by language users with no need to access non-linguistic information. The task of this article is threefold. First, I shall raise a criticism to Borg's minimalism based on how speakers disambiguate homonymy. Second, I will explore some ways Borg might respond to my argument and maintain that none of them offers a conclusive reply to my case. Third, I shall suggest that in order for Borg’s minimalism to accommodate the problem discussed in this paper, it should allow for semantically incomplete content and be converted into a claim about linguistic competence.
[Original title: “La Collera di Dio”]. The De ira Dei was composed at the beginning of the 4th century AD. In it Lactantius (ca. 240-320), a pupil of Arnobius who converted to Christianity and went on to become a prominent intellectual at the court of Constantine, ponders the problem of divine anger. Stoics and Epicureans would have it that anger is unworthy of a divine being and can affect only irrational or malevolent creatures. Yet, the scriptures repeatedly describe God as irate. How can these two premises be reconciled? According to Lactantius, we should shift away from the “pagan” dogma that anger is unworthy of a divine being, and consider God's capacity to become irate as an expression of her moral and ontological perfection. In other words, God's anger is not a failure of rationality or a sign of malevolence: it is the manifestation of a merciful pedagogy tirelessly laboring to foster the moral progress of mankind. This was the first complete edition of the De Ira Dei in modern Italian. I wrote the introduction, translated the text from Latin, and compiled a commentary.
A concise history of the idea of illusion. The book has three parts. The first part is about the history of the word illusion from its early origins in the Indo-European tree to present-day Romance and Germanic languages. The second part chronicles the role played by the notion of illusion in the Western philosophical canon, from the Presocratics to the beginning of the 20th century. The third part concludes with a bit of conceptual analysis. I try to shed light on the necessary and sufficient conditions for something to qualify as an “illusion”, and argue that illusions typically combine three signature features: representational error, encapsulation, and an element of surprise.
Referee for Mind & Language, the Philosophers’ Imprint, Analysis, Philosophical Studies, Synthese, Erkenntnis, The Philosophical Quarterly, Inquiry, Dialectica, Topoi, the International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Acta Analytica, the Review of Philosophy and Psychology, Idealistic Studies, Sistemi Intelligenti, and Bloomsbury Publishing.
I speak Italian, English, French, and basic German.
I read Latin and Ancient Greek.