Bare singular names and genericity

Luca Gasparri | luca.gasparri@cnrs.fr

AAM, Oct. 2024. Published in the *Journal of Semantics*, https://doi.org/10.1093/jos/ffae017

Abstract

Predicativists hold that proper names are count nouns with a predicative meaning, and treat bare singular names as predicative DPs headed by an unpronounced definite. However, bare singular names exhibit differences in grammatical behavior from ordinary definite singulars. One difference, it has been argued, is that while ordinary definite singulars can be interpreted generically, bare singular names cannot. This is not right: bare singular names can have generic uses. I present the evidence and offer an argument that generics with bare singular names are good news for predicativists.

Predicativism about proper names is the view that proper names are count nouns with a predicative meaning. The main motivation for predicativism is that names, in addition to referential uses, can have predicative uses (Burge 1973; Geurts 1997; Matushansky 2008; Fara 2015).

1. a. Ruth is intelligent.
   b. There's one Ruth in my department.
   c. Ruths are rare around here.

Predicativists treat bare singular names (henceforth, BSNs) as predicative DPs headed by an unpronounced definite article, mandatorily silent in English and optionally overt in (dialects of) languages like Italian.

2. a. (* The) Ruth is intelligent.
   b. (✓ La) Ruth è intelligente.

As a result, predicativists predict that BSNs should pattern in admissible grammatical behavior with definite singular DPs with ordinary count nouns and NPs, like *the tiger*.

3. a. ⟦∅ *Ruth*⟧ = ⟦*the*⟧ [λx.x is called Ruth][1]
   b. ⟦*the tiger*⟧ = ⟦*the*⟧ [λx.x is a tiger]

1 Predicativists offer different takes on the predicative meaning encoded by names. The "is called" analysis is the standard analysis, but [λx.x is named N], [λx.x bears the name 'N'] and other options have also been considered. Since the issue is orthogonal to my purposes, I simply assume the standard analysis. For discussion, see, *inter alia*, Fara (2011; 2015), Gray (2017), Jeshion (2015; 2018), Schoubye (2020), and Stojnić (2023).

The claim encounters a problem with genericity.[2]

4.	a. Ruth is common.	??
	b. Ruth is a dancer.	✓tk, ??gen
	c. The tiger is striped.	✓tk, ✓gen
	d. The tiger is widespread.	??tk, ✓gen

(4c) allows both for a reading where *the tiger* is a token tiger, and for a characterizing reading where *striped* is a predicate asserted to be generally true of tigers. (4d) is a felicitous kind-level generic.[3] In contrast, bare *Ruth* obligatorily takes a token reading. This generic recalcitrance is specific to BSNs (bare and definite plural names license generic readings fairly easily; see (5)) and persists under adverbs like *generally*, which often[4] improve the accessibility of generic readings for common definite singulars. Compare (6) and (7) ((7) is adapted from Dayal 2004).

5.	a. Marias are common.	✓gen
	b. (The) Jamals (in my town) are smart.	✓gen
6.	a. Ruth is 40 years old.	✓tk, ??gen
	b. Ruth is typically 40 years old.[5]	??
7.	a. The Rutgers professor is 40 years old.	✓tk, ??gen
	b. The Rutgers professor is generally 40 years old.	??tk, ✓gen

The non-parallel seems robust, and has been taken to indicate a problematic distributional discrepancy between names and common nouns. For instance, Delgado (2024: 342) writes: "A last piece of evidence that proper names behave differently from the definite descriptions to which they

2 Notation: "tk" indicates a (singular) token interpretation, "gen" a generic interpretation.

3 I am appealing to a version of the standard dichotomy between I-generics and D-generics (Krifka 1987). Amongst other things, the distinction tracks the intuition that while characterizing singular generics predicate properties that can be instantiated by token individuals that satisfy the NP under the definite article (token tigers can be striped), kind-level generics attribute properties that instances of the kind may be unable to bear (token tigers cannot be widespread). I will return to the distinction towards the conclusion.

4 But not always. "The book is generally short" cannot be interpreted generically absent a suitable context.

5 Example (6b) could be read as a token-level statement in a scenario where, say, Ruth pretends to have different ages in different contexts and the sentence means that most of the times Ruth pretends to be 40. In any case, (6b) needs a very specific context to work, hence the double question mark. *Mutatis mutandis* for (7b).

are supposed to be equivalent is that singular definites containing count nouns – that is, 'the F' when F is a count noun – can generate generic readings while bare singular proper names cannot."

I believe this is incorrect. Even though obtaining generic readings from BSNs is more challenging than with ordinary definite singulars, it is possible. My aim in this note is threefold: a) set the empirical record straight; b) offer an argument that generic uses of BSNs are good news for predicativists; c) suggest that, referentialism and predicativism aside, generic uses of BSNs are an understudied phenomenon that calls for closer scrutiny.

Let me begin with a clarification about the extension of the category of "generic sentences".[6] Consider (8), after a classic example by Barbara Partee (Carlson 1977).

8. a. The Coke bottle has a narrow neck. ✓tk, ✓gen
   b. The Coke bottle generally has a narrow neck. ??tk, ✓gen

(8a) and (8b) are both acceptable generic statements about Coke bottles. However, (8a) combines a count NP under the definite article and a VP; (8b) combines a count NP under the definite article, a quantificational adverb (QAdv), and a VP. Suppose that genericity-inducing QAdvs (such as *generally*, *usually*, *typically*) take wide scope and introduce quantification over situations or something of the sort.[7] Then (8a) and (8b) have the simplified LFs in (9a) and (9b) respectively, and convey their generic meaning in different ways: (8a) without the mediation of situations (and with standard scope under the operator *Gen*), (8b) by asserting that the NP individuals generally VP in the situations covertly introduced by the QAdv.[8]

9. a. [*the NP*] *VP*
   b. *QAdv* [[*the NP*] *VP*]

Call sentences of type (9a) "simple generics", and sentences of type (9b) "overt quantificational generics".[9] On a narrow interpretation, the anti-predicativist challenge would amount to the claim that BSNs do not license simple generics, which would be compatible with evidence that BSNs can receive generic readings if combined with QAdvs and other genericity-inducing expressions. On a

6 Thanks to a reviewer for encouraging me to make these preliminary remarks explicitly.

7 See Heim (1982), Diesing (1992), Kamp and Reyle (1993) and others.

8 So (8b) would mean something along the lines of: it is generally the case that in the situations introduced by the QAdv that feature a Coke bottle, the Coke bottle has a narrow neck.

9 "Overt" because on some approaches the *Gen* of "simple generics" is itself quantificational.

wide interpretation, the challenge would amount to the claim that BSNs cannot be generic *simpliciter*, and thus that BSNs do not license neither simple generics nor overt quantificational generics. As best I can tell, statements like Delgado's above can be charitably read as committed to the wide interpretation of the challenge, and thus to the idea that BSNs cannot have generic uses in either of the environments specified by (9a) and (9b). With that said, I will discuss generic uses of BSNs in sentences with *and* without genericity-inducing QAdvs, making the data bear on the anti-predicativist challenge irrespective of whether the latter is interpreted narrowly or widely.

Let us now turn to the evidence itself. Geurts (1997) presented examples with proper names that seemed to be semantically indefinite despite the absence of the indefinite article.

10. In English, Leslie may be a man or a woman, but John is always male. ??tk

In subsequent discussion, Matushansky (2008: 602–603) remarked that in (10) *Leslie* and *John* appear to mean "an individual named Leslie or John" and scope under a modal introduced by a covert conditional (*in English*), which in turn appears to refer to a naming convention. Now, (10) is not a generic sentence. However, it can be turned fairly easily into one.[10]

11. a. In English, Leslie is generally a woman. ??tk, ✓gen
    b. In England, Leslie is generally a woman.[11] ?tk, ✓gen

Analogous results can be obtained by dropping the locative adjunct and adding descriptive content inside the subject NP by means of an adjectival modifier. In Italy, Andrea is a primarily a male name; in Germany and elsewhere, it is primarily a female name. (12) seems acceptable to say that bearers of the name Andrea are typically male in Italy and female in Germany.

12. Italian Andrea is generally (a) male, German Andrea is generally (a) female. ?tk, ✓gen

The generic reading remains accessible if we drop the QAdv.

10 Please ignore the truth of the examples in (11).

11 Note that like other examples below, but unlike (11a), (11b) can get a marked token-level reading on which *Leslie* picks out a token individual and the VP is interpreted habitually: an individual named Leslie takes up different gender roles when traveling around the globe and in England is prevalently a woman (but, say, prevalently a man in Germany).

13. Italian Andrea is (a) male, German Andrea is (a) female. ✓tk, ✓gen

Note that the addition of a geographical adjective is not a surefire strategy to secure the accessibility of a generic reading for ordinary definite singulars.

14. a. The dish is nutritious. ✓tk, ??gen
    b. The Italian dish is nutritious. ✓tk, ??gen
    c. Italian dishes are nutritious. ??tk, ✓gen

Romance allows for analogous examples. (15a) and (16a) translate (12) and (13) in Italian; (15b) and (16b) translate (12) and (13) in French. Here the modified names take a mandatory definite article, which in Romance is standard behavior for modified nouns.

15. a. *(L') Andrea italiano è generalmente (un) maschio; *(l') Andrea tedesca è generalmente (una) femmina. ??tk, ✓gen
    b. *(L') Andrea italien est généralement (un) homme, *(l') Andrea allemande est généralement (une) femme. ??tk, ✓gen
16. a. *(L') Andrea italiano è (un) maschio, *(l') Andrea tedesca è (una) femmina. ✓tk, ✓gen
    b. *(L') Andrea italien est (un) homme, *(l') Andrea allemande est (une) femme. ✓tk, ✓gen

Next, it is known that definite singulars with common count NPs can function as bound variables (Geurts 1997) and as E-type expressions (Elbourne 2005). As a result, and similar to the indefinites in (17) (from Lasersohn 1997 and Leslie 2015, respectively), we can build donkey sentences with definite singular DPs that get generic a reading (see (18b)) even if the NP under the definite article resists the generic interpretation in overt quantificational generics (see (18a)).

17. a. Children who grow a new tooth$_i$ show it$_i$ off. ??tk, ✓gen
    b. Lions that see a gazelle$_i$ chase it$_i$. ??tk, ✓gen
18. a. The barn is typically red. ??tk, ??gen
    b. Every farm around here has a barn$_i$, and the barn$_i$ is typically red. ??tk, ✓gen

Donkey uses of BSNs are also attested. In such contexts, they can express intuitively general claims about individuals. (19) is a familiar example from Elbourne (2005).

19. Every woman who has a husband called John and a lover called Gerontius$_i$ takes only Gerontius$_i$ to the Rare Names Convention.

As before, (19) is not generic but, parallel to (18b), we can derive a generic from it.

20. Every woman's husband is called Gerontius$_i$, and Gerontius$_i$ is usually tall. ??tk, ✓gen

(21) removes syntactic binding and QAdvs from the equation.

21. We have collected data on school performance over the past five years across all public schools in the world, and categorized it by given name. According to the numbers, Ruth has good grades in biology, whereas Paul excels in latin. ??tk, ✓gen

Two proofs of genericity for the hesitant, following Krifka et al. (1995). First, (21) undergoes a minimal change in meaning after the insertion of a generic QAdv. Compare (22) and (23) disregarding the token reading of (22a).

22. a. The kangaroo rat is friendly to humans. ✓gen
    b. The kangaroo rat is generally friendly to humans. ✓gen
23. a. […] According to the numbers, Ruth has good grades in biology. ✓gen
    b. […] According to the numbers, Ruth generally has good grades in biology. ✓gen

Second, (21) is not upward entailing. Compare (24) and (25) disregarding the taxonomic reading of the failed entailment of (24b).

24. a. The kangaroo rat arrived. ??gen
    ⊨ A rodent arrived.
    b. The kangaroo rat has excellent night vision. ✓gen
    ⊭ A rodent has excellent night vision.
25. a. Ruth arrived. ??gen
    ⊨ A person whose name starts with 'r' arrived.
    b. […] According to the numbers, Ruth has good grades in biology. ✓gen
    ⊭ […] According to the numbers, a person whose name starts with 'r' has good grades in biology.

One could object that (21) works only because it introduces an anaphoric context that restricts the name to an *ad hoc* predicate such as, informally, [$\lambda x.x$ is called Ruth] ∩ [$\lambda x.x$ is in one of the schools concerned by the survey], which is not necessarily indicative of the possibilities available to vanilla occurrences of *Ruth*. However, (26) is simply about individuals and their names.

26. People have a tendency to fall in love with individuals with names of comparable length to theirs. In other words, Paul falls in love with Ruth, not with Clementine. ??tk, ✓gen

Similarly, (27a) would be unsurprising in a reading-a-baby-name-catalogue context as a statement about the properties generally true of bearers of the name *Regina*, against (27b), which needs appropriate quotational notation.[12]

27. a. Regina is noble and determined. ✓gen
    b. 'Regina' is a favorite among expecting parents.

Analogous examples can be formed in contexts where names have conspicuous sociolinguistic connotations and speakers assume a statistical correlation between naming conventions and social standing. In France, "historical" given names such as *Jean-Hubert* and *Apolline* are often thought to be prevalent in populations with a privileged socioeconomic background. By contrast, anglophone names such as *Kevin* and *Brenda* are thought to concentrate in less advantaged populations.[13] In a discussion on the sociology of French names, (28a) and (28b) would be acceptable generics.

28. a. Apolline is college educated, belongs to an upper middle class family, and her social milieu tends to engage in conspicuous consumption. ??tk, ✓gen
    b. (We have biases about names.) Even in the absence of real data, we assume that Jean-Hubert hails from an affluent family and that Kevin has humble beginnings. ??tk, ✓gen

(29) is an excerpt from Vandebosch (1998: 258).

12 Compare with Jeshion (2015) on "'Stella' is quite popular these days".

13 More on this in Coulmont (2022). For analogous biases in the English-speaking world, see, e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan's (2004) classical field experiment on the discrimination of "African-American-sounding" names in the US labor market.

29. What we find is that people who don't have anyone particular in mind when they hear a name have essentially the same name picture in their heads as those who do: Thomas is smart, sympathetic and attractive; Lancelot is well off but unsympathetic; Jordy is poor, somewhat lacking in intelligence and relatively unattractive; Laura is smart and sympathetic; Isolde is unattractive, etc.

Note, incidentally, that these bare unmodified occurrences reject the determiner in at least some of the languages or dialects where unmodified names can be headed by overt definite articles, against the pattern observed in (15). (30a) and (30b) are natural translations of (28a) and (28b) in Italian.[14]

30. a. (?? L') Apolline ha un'istruzione universitaria, appartiene a una famiglia di classe medio-alta, e il suo milieu sociale tende a praticare il consumo ostentativo.
b. (Abbiamo pregiudizi riguardo ai nomi.) Anche in assenza di dati reali, assumiamo che (?? il) Jean-Hubert provenga da una famiglia agiata e che (?? il) Kevin abbia origini umili.

I now turn to the theoretical import of these data points and their implications on the debate between referentialists and predicativists. I see three main options: a) dismiss the evidence; b) argue that the evidence merely shows that predicativism cannot be attacked by invoking the impossibility of generic uses of BSNs; c) grant that the evidence is good news for predicativism. The matter is complex, but let me offer a *reductio* for (c) by ruling out (a) and (b).

So, first, one could agree with the readings we have discussed, but deny that they show that BSNs can have generic uses. After all, many of the examples above appealed to contexts featuring the prior mention of a naming practice, a general focus on naming conventions, or a presupposition that homonymous individuals share properties above and beyond having the same name. Since these contexts are all genericity-inducing, the argument could continue, it is no surprise that when BSNs occur in them they get a generic reading. However, in such cases the generic reading is a product of the genericity-inducing context, not of the BSN, so we can accept the evidence but deny that it shows that BSNs can have generic uses.[15]

14 I will not dwell further on the non-parallel, but the following is a plausible explanation: as a rule, unmodified BSNs under the definite article in Italian refer to token individuals, so they must drop the article to take on a generic meaning; the reason we do not observe the same thing in (15) is that article elision is overridden by the adjectival modifiers.

15 Thanks to a reviewer for bringing up this potential criticism.

I do not find this response particularly persuasive. For comparison, (31a), after (8), shows that the DP *the green bottle* cannot be interpreted generically in out-of-the-blue contexts. However, Dayal (2004) observes that the DP can get a generic interpretation in sentences like (31b).

31. a. The green bottle has a narrow neck. ✓tk, ??gen
    b. We manufacture three types of bottles in this plant: green, blue, and clear. The green bottle has a narrow neck. ??tk, ✓gen

Now, *the green bottle* in (31b) is also introduced by a genericity-friendly premise that feeds a series of kinds in the domain of discourse and put them in focus. However, it would be odd to argue that because in (31b) sets up a context that allows *the green bottle* to express a generalization anaphorically restricted to the bottles manufactured in the plant, (31b) is not evidence that *the green bottle* can have generic uses. Likewise, it is known that count NPs for taxonomically high kinds need appropriate contexts to license definite singular generics (Mari, Beyssade and Del Prete 2013).

32. a. The Indian rhinoceros is vertebrate. ✓gen
    b. The mammal is vertebrate. ??gen
    c. Unlike the members of several other phyla, the mammal is vertebrate. ✓gen

But again, it would be odd to argue that because (32c) has an adjunct that biases strongly towards a generic interpretation, (32c) is not evidence that *the mammal* can have generic uses. *Mutatis mutandis*, the fact that some of the examples above have features that increase the likelihood of a generic reading is irrelevant to whether or not generic uses of BSNs are a grammatical possibility.

The second option is to argue that the evidence merely shows that predicativism cannot be attacked by invoking the impossibility of generic uses of BSNs. In other words, the evidence disarms the initial argument against predicativism, but does not supply a distributional parallel *for* the view the proper names are count nouns with predicative meanings.

Pursuing this reaction requires, I take it, an argument that the examples we have surveyed can be accounted within referentialism just as easily as within predicativism, and fall outside the class of uses that earlier work (e.g., Matushansky 2008) has called upon as empirical support for the view that names can enter syntax and composition as predicates, such as their ability to form singular DPs headed by the definite article in (dialects of) languages like Italian.[16] Conservatively,

16 Which, assuming referentialism, would need the name to be retrieved as a type e expression from the lexicon, shift into <e, t> to combine with the definite article, and then shift again from <e, t> to e.

BSNs must have predicative status when they take part in the derivation of generic readings. Barring ambiguity,[17] this means either, as predicativists would say, that names are lexically of type <e, t> and enter as such the derivation of BSN generics, or, as referentialists would say, that names have type e in the lexicon and enter the derivation of BSN generics after being shifted to <e, t>. I can offer no argument that downstream type shifting is not a live option here. Referentialists *have* used it to account for examples like (1b), (1c) and (5), and have claimed that all non-referential uses of names can be taken care of via type shifting.[18] That does not mean, however, that the evidence of generic uses of BSNs is neutral currency in the debate. It adds to the body of distributional evidence that can be accounted for straightforwardly under the view that names are of type <e, t>, and by the view that names are of type e only modulo additional maneuvers. Thinking otherwise would risk implying, contrary to much work in this area, that predicative uses of names are only weakly relevant to the determination of their lexical type.

I conclude with stressing that in addition to their relevance to the competition between referentialism and predicativism, generic uses of BSNs are an understudied phenomenon that raises several additional questions. One is the question of what BSNs denote or quantify over in generic sentences (candidates include normal individuals, sums or sets of individuals, and kinds) and of the precise compositional mechanisms underlying their generic interpretation (e.g., whether generic uses of BSNs in contexts with in-focus naming conventions involve binding of the naming relation). Another question concerns the relationship between the onomastic class of the name (e.g., whether the name is a given name or a family name; whether it names an animate individual or a geographical location) and the availability of their bare singular use in generic sentences. Note that (33b) (adapted from Jeshion 2018) seems to fail as a generic even if we assume a reading-a-baby-name-catalogue context or some equivalent scenario.

33. a. <u>The Romanov</u> is refined and cultivated. ✓gen
    b. <u>Romanov</u> is refined and cultivated. ??gen

Finally, there is the question of the distributional parallels and non-parallels between generic uses of BSNs and definite singular generics with common nouns, which have themselves received less

17 That is, the view that proper names are specified in the lexicon *both* as type e and as type <e, t> expressions.

18 See, e.g., Löbner (2011: 284–285): "[Matushansky 2008] argues that the lexical type of proper names is essentially <e, t> because this type fits the predicative and nondefinite uses of proper names. […] My argumentation will be converse […]: proper names express individual concepts; they are lexically of type e. If they are used predicatively or with indefinite or quantificational determination, they undergo a type shift from type e to <e, t>."

attention than other generics (e.g., indefinite singular and bare plural generics) and are subject to (as of yet) poorly understood restrictions.[19] One observation. The generics with BSNs we have discussed are all characterizing generics. Intuitively, it seems much harder to form kind-level generics with non-quoted BSNs.

34.	a. (In India,) The dodo is extinct.	✓gen
	b. The book became common in the 19th century.	✓gen
	d. (In Germany,) Tristan is extinct.	??
	e. John became common in the 19th century.	??
	f. (In Germany,) 'Tristan' is extinct.	✓gen
	g. 'John' became common in the 19th century.	✓gen

Jumping at the conclusion that this marks another problematic discrepancy for the predicativist would be too quick, since we encounter similar difficulties with common NPs (also, recall (32b)).

35.	a. Mountains are widespread.	??tk, ✓gen
	b. The mountain is widespread.	??
	c. Mountain lakes emerged around 3.5 billion years ago.	✓tk, ✓gen
	d. The mountain lake emerged around 3.5 billion years ago.	✓tk, ??gen

With that said, I am not aware that the comparison between generics with BSNs and ordinary definite singular generics has received attention. The matter probably deserves more scrutiny.

Author's address
STL, UMR CNRS 8163, Université de Lille
Domaine du Pont de Bois, Rue du Barreau
59650 Villeneuve d'Ascq, France
luca.gasparri@cnrs.fr

Acknowledgements
Thanks to Gerhard Schaden for discussion on an earlier draft, and to two anonymous reviewers for helpful feedback on the submitted manuscript. All errors are mine.

19 For discussion see, *inter alia*, Carlson (1977), Dahl (1985), Krifka et al. (1995), Partee (2004), and Cohen (2020).

References

Bertrand, Marianne, & Sendhil Mullainathan (2004), 'Are Emily and Greg more employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A field experiment on labor market discrimination'. *American Economic Review* **94**: 991–1013.

Burge, Tyler (1973), 'Reference and proper names'. *Journal of Philosophy* **70**: 425–439.

Carlson, Gregory N. (1977). *Reference to Kinds in English*. PhD thesis. University of Massachusetts Amherst.

Cohen, Ariel. (2020). *Something Out of Nothing: The Semantics and Pragmatics of Implicit Quantification*. Brill. Boston.

Coulmont, Baptiste (2022), *Sociologie des Prénoms.* 3rd edn. La Découverte. Paris.

Dayal, Veneeta (2004), 'Number marking and (in)definiteness in kind terms'. *Linguistics and Philosophy* **27**: 393–450.

Dahl, Östen (1985), *Tense and Aspect Systems.* Blackwell. Oxford.

Delgado, Laura (2024), 'Names are not (always) predicates'. *Mind & Language* **39**: 330–347.

Diesing, Molly (1992), *Indefinites.* MIT Press. Cambridge, MA.

Elbourne, Paul D. (2005), *Situations and Individuals*. MIT Press. Cambridge, MA.

Fara, Delia G. (2011), 'You can call me "stupid", … Just don't call me stupid'. *Analysis* **71**: 492–501.

Fara, Delia G. (2015), 'Names are predicates'. *Philosophical Review* **124**: 59–117.

Geurts, Bart (1997), 'Good news about the description theory of names'. *Journal of Semantics* **14**: 319–348.

Gray, Aidan (2017), 'Names in strange places'. *Linguistics and Philosophy* **40**: 429–472.

Heim, Irene (1982), *The Semantics of Definite and Indefinite Noun Phrases.* PhD thesis. University of Massachusetts Amherst.

Kamp, Hans, & Uwe Reyle (1993), *From Discourse to Logic.* Kluwer. Dordrecht.

Krifka, Manfred (1987), *An Outline of Genericity* (partly in collaboration with C. Gerstner). SNS-Bericht 87–25, University of Tubingen.

Krifka, Manfred, Francis J. Pelletier, Gregory N. Carlson, Alice ter Meulen, Gennaro Chierchia, & Godehard Link (1995), 'Genericity: An introduction'. In Gregory N. Carlson and Francis J. Pelletier (eds.), *The Generic Book*. University of Chicago Press. Chicago. 1–124.

Jeshion, Robin (2015), 'Referentialism and predicativism about proper names'. *Erkenntnis* **80**: 363–404.

Jeshion, Robin. (2018). 'Katherine and the Katherine: On the syntactic distribution of names and count nouns'. *Theoria* **33**: 473–508.

Lasersohn, Peter (1997), ‘Bare plurals and donkey anaphora’. *Natural Language Semantics* **5**: 79–86.

Leslie, Sarah-Jane (2015), ‘Generics oversimplified’. *Noûs* **49**: 28–54.

Löbner, Sebastian (2011), ‘Concept types and determination’. *Journal of Semantics* **28**: 279–333.

Mari, Alda, Claire Beyssade, & Fabio Del Prete (2013), ‘Introduction’. In Alda Mari, Claire Beyssade and Fabio Del Prete (eds.), *Genericity.* Oxford University Press. Oxford. 1–92.

Matushansky. Ora (2008), ‘On the linguistic complexity of proper names’. *Linguistics and Philosophy* **31**: 573–627.

Partee, Barbara. H. (2004). *Compositionality in Formal Semantics*. Blackwell. Malden, MA.

Schoubye, Anders J. (2020). ‘Names are variables’. *Philosophical Review* **129**: 53–94.

Stojnić, Una. (2023). ‘Being called’. *Synthese* **201**: article 70.

Vandebosch, Heidi (1998). ‘The influence of media on given names’. *Names* **43**: 243–262.